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1 INTRODUCTION 
 In March 2015, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) adopted a new set of network neutrality rules for the Internet.1  
In the process, the FCC declared for the first time that broadband 
Internet access service is a telecommunications service, which means 
that the FCC has authority to regulate broadband Internet access 
services under Title II of the Communications Act.  Many advocates 
for network neutrality celebrate this reclassification, thinking it will 
inevitably lead to the network neutrality protections they seek.  Many 
opponents of network neutrality mourn reclassification, thinking it 
will inevitably lead to the network neutrality intrusions they fear.  
Both sides are wrong to do so.  Even if the 2015 Report and Order that 
reclassifies Internet access withstands the inevitable efforts to 
overturn it, many of the most important aspects of network neutrality 
policy have yet to be determined.  Reclassification is not destiny, and 
network neutrality policy is far from settled. 
 Confusion on this point comes, in part, from the way the debate 
has been portrayed in the year leading up to this decision.  The press 
has often said that the FCC is deciding whether to “regulate 
broadband like a utility.”2  This is misleading in multiple ways.  To 
1 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (Mar. 12, 2015), available 
at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (Report and Order on 
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order). 
2 See Jacob Pramuk, FCC Votes to Classify Internet as a Public Utility, CNBC (Feb. 26, 
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102458909; Robert Siegel et al., FCC Proposal Would 
Regulate Internet Like a Public Utility, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 4, 2015), 
www.npr.org/2015/02/04/383860551/fcc-proposal-would-regulate-internet-like-a-
public-utility; Jeff Ward-Bailey, FCC Plans to Regulate the Internet as a Public Utility, 
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begin with, the FCC never even considered regulating the Internet in a 
way that is all that similar to electric utilities, water utilities, or even 
telephone companies.  What the FCC actually considered is whether to 
derive authority from the same portion of the Communications Act 
when regulating Internet, as when regulating telephone companies.  
We must not confuse the source of authority used to justify a public 
policy with the policy itself.  If it wished, the FCC could claim 
authority under Title II while choosing not to adopt any network 
neutrality regulations at all, as the FCC has broad discretion in the 
actual policy.3   In the end, it is policy that will affect the future of the 
Internet.  Policies should be chosen because they serve the public 
interest, whereas the authority used to adopt those polices should be 
chosen because that authority is firmly rooted in law. 
 This paper will describe the important next steps in the network 
neutrality policy debate that will follow the March 2015 Report and 
Order.  The first step is likely to occur in the courts after a legal 
challenge to reclassification.  Thus, Section 2 will address the legality 
of reclassification.  I have previously argued4 that a decision by the 
FCC to classify commercial Internet access as a telecommunications 
service would be consistent with the Communications Act, as 
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the FCC 
adopted the core of my argument in the 2015 Report and Order.5  The 
next step will occur at the FCC. As shown in Section 3, the FCC left 
some of the most important policy issues unresolved in its 2015 
Report and Order, and we cannot know the real meaning of the 
network neutrality rules until those issues are decided.  Section 3 will 
also propose some policy options for the FCC to consider. Regardless 
of what happens in the courts and at the FCC, network neutrality 
policy will be debated in Congress, and there is a possibility that 
legislation will emerge.  Section 4 presents several forms that 
legislation might take—particularly if the legislation is motivated by a 
                                                                                                                   
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 2, 2015), 
www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2015/0202/FCC-plans-to-regulate-the-Internet-as-a-
public-utility-report-video.  
3 See Joshua L. Mindel & Marvin A. Sirbu, Regulatory Treatment of IP Transport and 
Services, DSPACE@MIT (Sept. 2000), http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/1514. 
4 See Barbara A. Cherry & Jon M. Peha, Commentary, The Telecom Act of 1996 Requires 
the FCC to Classify Commercial Internet Access as a Telecom Service: In the Matter of 
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC GN Docket No. 14-2 (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=60001010836. 
5 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1.  
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desire to reverse the FCC’s 2015 Report and Order, and some of the 
complex issues that must be considered. The paper is concluded in 
Section 5. 
2 THE COURTS: INTERNET ACCESS IS A TELECOM SERVICE 
 The first challenge to the FCC’s 2015 ruling will be a legal one.  
Will the courts find that the FCC was acting within its authority when 
it reclassified Internet access as a telecommunications service, instead 
of an information service?  This section will explain why, once the FCC 
chose to revisit the issue of classification, the FCC was allowed, if not 
required by existing law, to classify commercial Internet access as a 
telecommunications service.  Portions of this section appeared in a 
comment to the FCC by Cherry and Peha.6 The FCC cited this 
comment heavily in its Report and Order when justifying its decision 
on this matter.7 
 Although many regulatory details are delegated to the FCC as an 
expert agency, the FCC is still required to follow the laws passed by 
Congress and signed by the President.  Congress did not pass a law 
providing the FCC discretion to define telecommunications service or 
information service as it sees fit.  Thus, the issue before the FCC, and 
now to be reviewed by the courts, is whether the broadband Internet 
access service as it is provided in 2015 meets the definition of 
telecommunications service mandated by the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.   
 There is no explicit statement within the 1996 Act on how these 
two definitions may or may not apply to the Internet, simply because 
lawmakers were not paying close attention to the Internet in 1996.  
The Internet is only mentioned in the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
in two sections:  in a section on the e-rate program that would help 
fund Internet access for K-12 schools and libraries, and in a section on 
Communications Decency that would attempt to limit indecent 
content on the Internet.  Nevertheless, the definitions of 
telecommunications and information services are reasonably clear. 
This section shows that if one applies these statutory definitions, 
commercial Internet access services as they are offered today are 
“telecommunications services,” and not “information services.”  (Note 
that what matters is how these services are offered today, and not how 
services were offered in 1996 or at the time of other legal or regulatory 
6 For a more complete discussion of the issue, see Cherry & Peha, supra note 4. 
7 See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1. 
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decisions.)  The core offering of an Internet access service today is 
what I call “IP Packet Transfer,” which is telecommunications, and the 
commercial offering of IP Packet Transfer is a telecommunications 
service.  Indeed, modern Internet access services fit the definition of 
telecommunications service established by Congress at least as well as 
commercial telephone services based on traditional circuit-switched 
technology—if not better.  
2.1 IP Packet Transfer is Telecommunications 
 We cannot begin to decide what regulations do and do not apply to 
Internet service providers (ISPs) until we define what they do.  The 
fundamental service of the Internet is the transfer of one or more 
Internet Protocol (IP) packets from sender to intended recipient, or a 
service I call “IP Packet Transfer,” which is defined below. In that 
process, a packet may pass through multiple networks, each of which 
is providing an IP Packet Transfer service of its own.  
A network provides IP Packet Transfer when it 
transfers IP packets from an ingress point that is 
receiving IP packets from the sender, to an egress point 
that can send IP packets to the intended recipient.   
 This section will show that IP Packet Transfer fits the statutory 
definition of “telecommunications.” According to the 
Telecommunications Act, “the term ‘telecommunications’ means the 
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of 
information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or 
content of the information as sent and received.”8 
 It is clear that IP Packet Transfer means transmission of 
information that is of the packet sender’s choosing, because the 
sender chooses what information to put in each packet.  Moreover, it 
is the nature of IP Packet Transfer that the “form and content of the 
information” is precisely the same when an IP packet is sent by the 
sender as when that same packet is received by the recipient. These 
are both consistent with the above definition.  
 The one remaining definitional issue, whether IP Packet Transfer 
occurs “between or among points specified by the user,” is more 
8 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(48), available at 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. § 153(43)). 
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complicated.  The sender places the IP address of the packet’s 
intended recipient in each IP packet.  In some cases, the sender knows 
the recipient’s IP address already, and, in some cases, the sender must 
first look up the desired IP address.  Either way, communications is 
clearly to a point specified by the user sending the packet.  Similarly, 
in a telephone network, the sender may not know the physical location 
of the points it specifies, but an IP address (or a telephone number) 
completely specifies the endpoint. For the portion of traffic for which 
the packet’s sender and intended recipient are both customers of the 
same Internet access provider, that is the entire story.   
 The Internet is a network of networks, however, and this is not 
always the case.  Consider the case where an IP packet travels through 
several networks before reaching its destination.  Collectively, these 
networks are sending the packet to the point specified by the sender.  
Individually, each network is sending the packet to an egress point 
that the network has determined is en route to the point specified by 
the user.  This is essentially the same as long-distance calls in the 
traditional telephone network, where information travels through a 
local exchange carrier, then through a long-distance carrier, and 
finally through another local exchange carrier. Each of these 
telephone carriers is still said to provide telecommunications.  Thus, 
the same must be said of each ISP that provides IP Packet Transfer. 
 Note that the analysis above assumed only that a network used IP 
from ingress to egress.  As a result, this analysis is applicable to a wide 
range of networks, including those designed for cable TV, wireline 
telephony, or cellular telephony.  The Internet is based on a layered 
design.  Underneath the IP layer, there may be a variety of physical 
infrastructure types, including fiber-optic cable, twisted pair copper, 
and wireless, as well as a variety of link-layer protocols, including the 
Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS)9 protocol, 
used by many cable TV companies; the Point-to-Point Protocol over 





9 Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) is a protocol that is commonly 
used to provide broadband Internet access over cable TV networks.  In these networks, IP 
typically runs on top of DOCSIS. 
10 Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) is a protocol that is commonly used to 
provide Digital Subscriber Loop (DSL) broadband Internet access service over 
infrastructure that was initially developed for telephone service.  In these networks, IP 
typically runs on top of PPPoE. 
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the Long Term Evolution (LTE)11 protocol, used by many cellular 
companies. On top of the IP layer, there can be a variety of transport 
protocols, including Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), and home-grown proprietary protocols, as 
well as a variety of applications, including voice over IP (VOIP), web 
browsing, and video streaming.   None of this influences the analysis.  
In today’s Internet, the IP protocol is used to transfer information 
from an ingress point to an egress point, and IP Packet Transfer meets 
the legal definition of telecommunications, regardless of the layers 
above or below. This includes when IP Packet Transfer is used for web 
browsing over a wired network and when it is used for video 
streaming over a wireless network.  Advocates will undoubtedly argue 
over whether the public interest is best served by network neutrality 
policies that treat Internet access over wired networks differently from 
Internet access over wireless networks, but it is clear that both are 
“telecommunications” under current law. 
2.2 A Commercial Internet Access Service Is 
a Telecommunications Service 
 When Internet access is provided on a commercial basis, this fits 
the statutory definition of “telecommunications service.” According to 
the Telecommunications Act, “the term ‘telecommunications’ means 
the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or 
to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the 
public, regardless of the facilities used.”12  
 By definition, a commercial Internet access service is offered “for a 
fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively 
available directly to the public.”  Internet access services vary 
somewhat from one Internet access provider to another, but the core 
offering is IP Packet Transfer, which is telecommunications, as shown 
in Section 2.1.  It is IP Packet Transfer that subscribers are seeking 
when they sign up for an ISP.  Other functions of an Internet access 
provider are separable from the core offering, done only in support of 
the core offering, or both. 
11 Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a 4th generation wireless technology that is commonly 
used to provide broadband Internet access service over cellular networks.  In these 
networks, IP typically runs on top of LTE. 
12 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(51), available at 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. § 153(46)). 
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 A prominent example is electronic mail (“e-mail”). E-mail is an 
information service. In the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 
when the FCC and Supreme Court were making decisions about what 
constituted a telecommunications service, e-mail may have seemed 
like a crucial component of any Internet access service.  E-mail was 
the original “killer app.”  Today, we all know better. Most Americans 
get their e-mail from separate application service providers such as 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, or from their employers or schools.  
While most Internet access providers do provide e-mail as well, it is 
clear that if they choose not to, their customers will simply go 
elsewhere for this service.  E-mail is not an essential part of a 
commercial Internet access service.  It is easily separable, and whether 
an Internet access provider chooses to offer an e-mail service should 
not be considered when determining whether the Internet access 
service is a telecommunications or information service. 
 A similar, but subtler, example is support for use of the Domain 
Name System (DNS).  DNS is the global directory service that allows 
users to map human-readable names such as “www.fcc.gov” into IP 
addresses.  These IP addresses can then be placed in the header of an 
IP packet, so that the IP Packet Transfer system can send the packet to 
its intended recipient.  It is common for Internet access providers to 
place resolvers with caches in their network to facilitate this function 
for subscribers. Some people have made the mistake of viewing this as 
a core function of an Internet access provider, and an information 
service, when it is actually neither.  The DNS look-ups provided by 
these resolvers make the Internet more useful, just as a phone book 
makes the telephone network more useful, but IP Packet Transfer 
works just as well without DNS look-ups.  Internet users could get the 
IP addresses they need through means other than DNS look-ups, just 
as telephone users can often get the telephone numbers they need 
through means other than a phone book. 
 There are three reasons why an Internet access service does not 
become an information service simply because it includes access to 
DNS resolvers. First, it is separable.  At the time of these FCC and 
Supreme Court decisions, it was probably difficult to imagine that an 
ISP could exist and not play a role in helping its subscribers make 
DNS queries.  Now, we all know better. DNS support can easily be 
separated from IP Packet Transfer, and, today, some Internet users 
turn to Application Service Providers (such as Google) for this service, 
rather than to their Internet access provider. Thus, DNS should be 
viewed as an extraneous capability, like e-mail, not required for the 
core service.  
 Second, even when offered by the Internet access provider, this 
DNS capability is clearly only there in support of the core function of 
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IP Packet Transfer, which is telecommunications.  According to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, even a function that might 
otherwise be an information service will not be considered as such if it 
is merely used “for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a 
telecommunications service,”13 which is the case here.   
 Third, for the purposes of categorization, there is little difference 
between DNS support offered by an Internet access provider and the 
411 directory service offered by many telephone service providers. 
Both allow a user to discover how to reach another party, and both are 
extraneous but useful conveniences offered to supplement a 
telecommunications service.  No one argued that telephone companies 
were not providing a telecommunications service because they offered 
411.  Thus, DNS support should not be considered when determining 
whether commercial Internet access providers offer a 
telecommunications service or an information service. 
 Internet access providers also typically assign IP addresses to their 
customers, either on a static or dynamic basis.  This process is 
important because it makes it unlikely that two end points will ever 
adopt the same address—a situation that would cause problems for 
both the network and the end users.  Thus, it is another mechanism 
“for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications 
system or . . . service” in support of the IP Packet Delivery 
telecommunications service, and therefore not an information service.  
Moreover, the assignment of IP addresses is similar to the assignment 
of telephone numbers in the telephone network, and there is no 
debate over whether telephone networks offer telecommunications 
services.  Most telephone users get a new telephone number by 
requesting it from their telephone provider. In some cases, users ask 
their new telephone provider to determine whether the user can 
regain rights to a phone number that the user once had with a 
different provider, but this still requires coordination with the new 
phone company.  Static IP addresses could be assigned in a similar 
manner, with Internet access providers assigning addresses when 
service begins.  Users who want their IP addresses assigned on a 
dynamic basis typically learn about the assignment from a server 
operated by the Internet access provider using a protocol called 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP).  There is some 





13 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(41), available at 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. § 153(20)). 
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address over the telephone from an employee of the telephone 
company, but the use of a server is not consequential with respect to 
categorization. Indeed, other systems that offer telecommunications 
services also operate servers that provide important information 
dynamically in a similar manner.  For example, a cell phone can 
request information from nearby towers about geographic location, or 
whether a phone call through those towers would incur roaming 
charges.  
2.3 A Commercial Internet Access Service 
Is Not an Information Service 
 Finally, Internet access does not fit the statutory definition of 
“information service,” which is defined below. 
The term ‘information service’ means the offering of a 
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or 
making available information via telecommunications, 
and includes electronic publishing, but does not 
include any use of any such capability for the 
management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a 
telecommunications service.14 
 In IP Packet Transfer, packets are moved from sender to recipient 
without any change in format or content. This can be done without 
offering any of the things that the Telecommunication Act of 1996 
states must be included in an information service.  Merely transferring 
a packet to its intended recipient does not, by itself, involve 
generating, acquiring, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, 
or making available information.  Of course, it is possible to make use 
of IP Packet Transfer to acquire information or to make information 
available, just as it is possible to make use of telephone calls to acquire 
information or make information available.  For example, services 
have emerged whereby telephone users can call a given information 
provider to hear prerecorded messages with anything from sports 
scores to daily prayers. This does not change the fact that a 
commercial Internet access service and a commercial telephone 
service are both telecommunications services under the 
14 Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 13. 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.  IP Packet Transfer does involve 
storage, but only in the sense that each packet can be queued at any 
router until it is the packet’s turn to be transmitted by that router.  
Still, this ephemeral storage of a packet while in transit is not a 
storage service.  Indeed, users would much prefer that their packets 
spend as little time as possible in buffers waiting to be transmitted.  
It cannot reasonably be said that Internet access providers are 
providing the service of deliberately storing packets any more than the 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is providing the service of 
deliberately storing humans merely because there are sometimes 
many humans at the DMV waiting to be served. 
 There are some functions that are common, if not required, in a 
commercial Internet Access Provider that do involve “generating, 
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or 
making available information.”15  In addition to those already 
described in Section 2.2, commercial Internet access providers may 
want information systems for account management and billing, for 
configuration management, for the monitoring of failures and other 
state information, and to keep track of which addresses are reachable 
through each of the interconnected neighboring networks.  All of these 
fall within the exception of “use of any such capability for the 
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or 
the management of a telecommunications service” as explicitly 
defined in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.16  Additionally, they do 
not differ much from functions in the telephone system, and the 
existence of these functions did not make telephony an information 
service. 
 Many Internet access providers also provide true information 
services, as defined in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, merely to 
supplement their telecommunications service, but not as an integral 
part of that telecommunications service.  Examples include e-mail and 
news sites, both of which are easily separable from Internet access.  
These companies may also lease customer premises equipment (CPE), 
or sell t-shirts.  None of these aspects matter when determining 
whether commercial Internet access services are telecommunications 
or information services.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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3 THE FCC: LARGE ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED 
 Even assuming that the 2015 Report and Order withstands a legal 
challenge, the FCC left some core network neutrality issues largely 
unresolved, so further action will be required before anyone can know 
the true impact of these rules.  For example, future decisions on what 
the FCC is now calling “non-BIAS data services” (where BIAS is 
broadband Internet access service)17 could drastically change the 
practical effect of the FCC’s 2015 rules.  Indeed, it could affect whether 
these rules have much effect at all. Section 3.1 describes several 
unresolved issues and why they are so important.  Section 3.2 
proposes some effective options that the FCC could consider when 
making decisions on these issues.   
3.1 Uncertainty and the Specialized Services Loophole 
 Probably the most important unresolved issue involves what this 
author has previously called the “specialized services loophole.”18 This 
involves what the new order calls “non-BIAS data services,”19 and 
what the FCC previously called “specialized services” or “managed 
services.”20 This loophole could make some Open Internet rules 
irrelevant.  Moreover, as this section will show, unresolved questions 
about the meaning of “unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably 
disadvantage”21 are also important. 
17 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1, at 10, 75. 
18 Jon M. Peha, Commentary, A “Most Favored Nation” Approach to an Open Internet: In 
the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC GN Docket No. 14-28, at 
9-10 (July 15, 2014), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=6017983949; Jon M. 
Peha, Commentary, Appropriate Rules for Managed or Specialized Services: In the 
Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC GN Docket No. 14-28, at 2-3 
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=60001007243. 
19 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1, at 75. 
20 Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, at 61-
62 (Dec. 23, 2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
201A1_Rcd.pdf (Report and Order); Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC 
Rcd. 5561, at 22 (May 15, 2014), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-61A1_Rcd.pdf (Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking). 
21 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1, at 9. 
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 The FCC has “tentatively concluded that it should not apply its 
conduct-based rules to services offered by broadband providers that 
share capacity with BIAS over providers’ last-mile facilities,” but are 
not BIAS themselves, although the FCC will “closely monitor their 
development and use” of these services.22  To demonstrate the impact 
of this potentially massive loophole, consider an issue that casual 
readers of the FCC’s 2015 rules might think has been resolved 
irrefutably—the legality of paid prioritization.   The rules have the 
appearance of certainty:  “today we adopt carefully-tailored rules that 
would prevent specific practices we know are harmful to Internet 
openness—blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.”23 “Paid 
prioritization occurs when a broadband provider accepts payment 
(monetary or otherwise) to manage its network in a way that benefits 
particular content, applications, services, or devices.”24 For example, 
perhaps Hulu pays a broadband provider to prioritize the transfer of 
video streams to affiliated smart televisions, or Apple pays a 
broadband provider to prioritize the transfer of music streams to the 
latest model of iPhone, or Amazon pays a provider to prioritize the 
transfer of e-books to its e-readers.  If a broadband provider is foolish 
enough to label these as services it offers on top of broadband Internet 
access, then the provider will clearly run afoul of the FCC’s new rule 
against paid prioritization.  On the other hand, if the broadband 
provider simply chooses to label this as a “non-BIAS data service”  
that just happens to get priority access to capacity that would 
otherwise be used for Internet access, then the broadband provider 
appears to be exempt of conduct-based Open Internet rules, including 
the supposedly “bright-line” rule against paid prioritization.  Indeed, 
the FCC specifically included this  example of prioritizing the transfer 
of e-books to affiliated e-readers in its examples of non-BIAS data 
services.25 When prioritizing the transfer of e-books in return for 
payment from the e-book publisher, at a technical level, there need be 
no difference between doing so as a non-BIAS data service, which is 






22 Id. at 96. 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 Id. at 97. 
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 Moreover, if one cares about promoting competition and 
innovation, the fact that paid prioritization may occur under a 
different name is not the biggest problem.  These rules allow overtly 
anticompetitive acts. Perhaps through these allegedly non-BIAS 
services, the broadband provider will provide superior quality of 
service when transferring video, audio, and e-books to affiliated 
content providers at a price of one cent per GB, and to unaffiliated 
content providers at a price of $1 million per GB, thereby gaining 
monopoly or oligopoly control over any upstream service that requires 
superior quality of service.  In the absence of rules against such 
practices within non-BIAS data services, broadband providers could 
easily have the ability and incentive to adopt such practices. 
 This loophole may undermine the FCC’s rule against blocking as 
well.  A provider of a BIAS is not allowed to “block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices.”26 By definition, 
however, BIAS rules only apply if the service “provides the capability 
to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all 
Internet endpoints,”27which will not be the case if traffic to or from a 
significant number of Internet endpoints is blocked.  Thus, the mere 
act of blocking may make the FCC’s “bright-line” rule against blocking 
inapplicable.  It appears that blocking is permissible, regardless of the 
criteria used for blocking, as long as the number of endpoints blocked 
is “substantial.” 
 The root cause of this loophole is that the FCC has created a legal 
distinction where no technical distinction exists, as the examples 
above demonstrate.  There is no practical difference between the case 
where a provider offers both a BIAS and a separate non-BIAS data 
service over the same, shared capacity, and the case where a provider 
uses 100% of the capacity to offer a BIAS and some specialized non-
BIAS services happen to run on top.  Thus, regulations that limit how 
capacity is allocated within a BIAS, but not how capacity is allocated 
between BIAS and non-BIAS data services or how capacity is allocated 
among non-BIAS data services, will inevitably be easy to circumvent.  
One way the FCC could address this problem is by returning to the 
pre-2015 view that not all non-BIAS services should be considered 
specialized services and by providing appropriate guidance as to what 
should and should not be included. 
26 Id. at 7. 
27 Id. at 82. 
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 While the FCC Report and Order28 does not expressly prohibit the 
practices described above, some uncertainty remains.  Even though 
the FCC “tentatively” concluded that conduct-based rules do not apply 
to non-BIAS data services, it also left the door open for limits by 
stating that “non-BIAS data services may still be subject to 
enforcement action.”29 This could occur if “these types of service 
offerings are undermining investment, innovation, competition, and 
end-user benefits...”30 This is a vague standard. It remains to be seen 
how the FCC will determine whether a service undermines 
investment, innovation, competition or end-user benefits; when this 
will be enough to overcome the FCC’s tentative decision not to apply 
rules; and what rules and enforcement actions are applicable when the 
FCC does make such a determination.  These questions are certain to 
arise in the coming years, and, until they are resolved, it is difficult to 
know how big the specialized service loophole is. 
 There are at least two reasonable ways to limit the loophole.  One 
is to establish a much narrower definition of the class of services to 
which Open Internet rules may not fully apply. Unfortunately, the 
FCC made this harder in the 2015 ruling by changing the name of this 
class from “specialized services” to “non-BIAS data services”—the 
latter implying that any data service that does not meet the 
previously-established definition of BIAS must meet the definition of 
a non-BIAS data service.  For the definition of this less-regulated class 
to be based on sound policy, rather than legacy definitions from other 
contexts, I will use the phrase “specialized service” instead of “non-
BIAS data service.”  The reasonable alternative to narrowly defining 
specialized services is to impose rules on specialized services that 
prohibit some forms of blocking and discrimination, though these 
rules could differ from those that apply to standard BIAS. Section 3.2 
will explore both of these approaches.   It is important to note from 
the above that anyone who wants to devise an effective policy cannot 
address the issues of what a specialized service is and what rules 
should apply to such a service in isolation.  These two issues are 
intertwined. 
 It is similarly difficult to separate rules regarding specialized 
services from rules regarding another aspect of the FCC Report and 
Order that remains a subject for FCC consideration.  According to the 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 97. 
30 Id. 
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2015 rules, broadband providers “shall not unreasonably interfere 
with or unreasonably disadvantage” either end users or edge providers 
in their communications.31 Applications may emerge that would 
benefit from better Quality of Service (QoS) than what is widely 
available on the Internet today.  Allocating resources to improve the 
QoS of some traffic streams often has the effect of decreasing QoS of 
other streams.  That sounds like disadvantaging—but is it 
unreasonable disadvantaging?  Whether a broadband provider can 
provide that superior QoS depends on precisely what it means to 
unreasonably interfere or disadvantage other streams, and the FCC 
plans to decide this in the coming years on a case-by-case basis.  In 
particular, can a provider offer better QoS within a BIAS, charge more 
for it, and let end users decide whether to use it?  If the provider 
charges an edge provider, then this is clearly prohibited as paid 
prioritization, but the 2015 Report and Order does not clearly indicate 
whether this would be allowed if the provider charges the end user.  
The Report and Order does say that “a practice that…is consistent 
with promoting consumer choice is less likely to unreasonably 
interfere with or cause an unreasonable disadvantage,”32 and each 
consumer can choose whether to use the superior, more expensive 
service. However, saying that this practice is merely “less likely” to 
violate Open Internet rules is certainly not definitive.   
 If the FCC decides to allow some forms of discrimination that are 
deemed to be reasonable within a BIAS, then these applications can 
operate under general Open Internet rules. Then, the FCC can greatly 
limit what constitutes a non-BIAS data service or specialized service 
without accidentally prohibiting these applications.  In this case, there 
may be little reason to regulate non-BIAS data services.  On the other 
hand, if the FCC greatly limits the discrimination allowed under BIAS 
rules, with the belief that applications like telemedicine will simply 
shift to non-BIAS data services, then non-BIAS data service will 
require a broad definition.  In that case, there should be more rules 
regulating non-BIAS data services.  Thus, these issues are also 
intertwined.  
3.2 Policy Options 
 This section describes objectives and constraints that the FCC 
should consider when it resolves the open issues described in Section 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 Id. at 61. 
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3.1, and presents two viable options that would balance these 
objectives, as proposed in Appropriate Rules for Managed or 
Specialized Services.33  Section 3.2.1 explains the advantages of Open 
Internet rules that allow reasonable discrimination to support 
applications that require better QoS, and why rules that prohibit 
unreasonable discrimination are valuable.  This balance could be 
achieved in rules for BIAS, rules for specialized services, or both.  
Section 3.2.2 describes a policy where many applications requiring 
better QoS choose specialized services, so the definition of specialized 
service is broad, and there are more rules regulating specialized 
services.  Section 3.2.3 describes a policy where applications requiring 
better QoS can get the reasonable discrimination they need in basic 
Internet access, so the definition of specialized service can be much 
narrower and the rules governing specialized services can be more 
relaxed.  The options are summarized and compared in Section 3.2.4. 
3.2.1 Reasonable Discrimination Can Help Consumers.  
Unreasonable Discrimination Can Harm Consumers. 
 As discussed in The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network 
Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, consumers can 
greatly benefit from some uses of discrimination and can be harmed 
by other uses of discrimination.34  Ideally, we should seek Open 
Internet rules that encourage the beneficial and prohibit the harmful, 
although tradeoffs are inevitable. 
 Some applications benefit from superior QoS, which is best 
provided through some form of discrimination, and more such 
applications could emerge if superior QoS became widely available. 
For example, someday a telemedicine application may allow patients 
to recover from surgery in their own homes with constant monitoring 
from medical professionals at a hospital.  An ISP could use 
discrimination to ensure that QoS is adequate for medical monitoring.  
Thus, some applications that benefit from superior QoS actually 
involve life and death, although many do not. For example, those 
recovering patients and their healthy neighbors may want to listen to 
music streamed by Internet radio stations, but with guarantees that 
transient congestion will not ruin the sound.  To avoid denying 
33 Peha, Appropriate Rules for Managed or Specialized Services, supra note 18.  
34 See Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the 
Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT’L JOURNAL OF COMMC’N 644 (2007), 
http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/154/90. 
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Internet users the benefits of these applications, FCC rules should not 
prohibit the kind of discrimination that makes such applications 
possible, nor should FCC rules prevent an ISP from charging for these 
services because the services may not emerge unless someone pays for 
them. These examples should be considered reasonable 
discrimination.  In the best cases, Internet access providers would 
simply be allocating limited resources to improve the QoS of those 
applications that benefit the most from those resources and charging 
for the resources allocated. 
 Arrangements like these become problematic when an ISP with 
market power seeks to extract oligopoly rents through fine-tuned 
discrimination.35 Perhaps the telemedicine application requires the 
exact same QoS from the network as a new multiplayer game, but if 
the network is allowed to set prices based on the application users 
choose, rather than based on the QoS the network offers, the ISP will 
charge very different prices for telemedicine and gaming.  In each 
case, with limited competition, the ISP will charge the maximum that 
the market will bear for that particular application, and consumers 
could see higher prices and less availability for content and 
applications as a result.  Alternatively, someone may wish to use the 
same underlying service that supports the streaming of music to 
support the streaming of political speeches against mergers in the 
telecom industry.  Would an ISP agree to carry the music, but not 
carry the speeches?  These are examples of discrimination based on 
application and content, and discrimination by those criteria should 
be considered unreasonable discrimination.  If an ISP with market 
power has unrestricted ability to discriminate based on content and 
application, then it has the ability and the incentive to give content 
providers affiliated with the ISP an advantage over competitors. 
Moreover, it would have incentive to bring separate oligopoly rents 
onto each distinct application or content market, even when that 
application or content market is highly competitive.36  In accordance 
with the Open Internet principles, it should be considered 
unreasonable to block or discriminate with respect to QoS or price 
solely based on content, application, user, or type of attached device 
when none of these factors affect the scarce resources the network 
must allocate.  It should be considered reasonable to discriminate 
between Class A service and Class B service with respect to QoS and 
price if both services are available to all, but unreasonable if some 
35 Id. at 652-57. 
36 Id. 
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users can access one service and other, similarly-situated users 
cannot. 
3.2.2   Option 1:  Broad Definition of Specialized Service and 
Meaningful Regulation of Specialized Services 
 First, consider the case where many applications that require 
superior QoS would have to operate over specialized services because 
the rule against “unreasonably interfering with or unreasonably 
disadvantaging”37 does not allow this form of discrimination within a 
BIAS, or this rule does not allow payment to Internet access providers 
for offering superior QoS.  In this case, we can expect different, 
specialized services to emerge, each with a QoS that is appropriate for 
a different application type; this may be consistent with the FCC’s 
current view that all non-BIAS data services are specialized services.  
In this case, however, there should be rules governing these 
specialized services to prevent unreasonable discrimination, and rules 
of this kind do not currently exist. 
 Section 3.2.1 argued that Open Internet rules should allow ISPs to 
offer services of different QoS, which requires some form of 
discrimination, but also argued that some uses of discrimination 
should not be allowed. For example, Open Internet rules should not 
allow Internet access providers to offer a given specialized service to 
some users, perhaps those affiliated with the ISP, and not to others 
who are similarly situated; it should be deemed unreasonable to favor 
some users over others in this way.  In addition, Internet access 
providers should be able to take into account technically relevant 
factors that affect cost, such as data rate or guaranteed latency, when 
setting prices for specialized services. Open Internet rules should not 
allow these providers to employ unreasonable discrimination and 
base prices on content or application. Further, providers should not be 
allowed to employ unreasonable blocking to limit access to a 
specialized service based on content or application and block non-
conforming traffic.   
 All of the unreasonable discrimination described above would be 
prohibited, while still allowing Internet access providers to offer 
superior QoS through discrimination through either of the two 
following policies.  In a more traditional approach, ISPs could be 
required to post the types of specialized services they offer, including 
the form of discrimination or a technical description of the QoS that is 
37 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 1, at 9. 
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expected as a result of that discrimination, and the associated prices.  
The Internet access provider must make the same options available to 
similarly-situated users, and those users would be free to choose the 
specialized service that meets their needs.  Alternatively, in what I 
have called a “Most Favored Nation” approach,38 ISPs could negotiate 
individually to create new arrangements for specialized services, but 
the details of those arrangements would subsequently become public, 
and other similarly-situated users would be given the right to demand 
an arrangement with the ISP that has the same technical and financial 
terms and conditions.  Again, those arrangements should be based on 
the form of discrimination or a technical description of the QoS that is 
expected as a result—not on content or application.  The latter 
approach gives Internet access providers greater flexibility, while still 
offering protection against unreasonable discrimination and the 
extraction of oligopoly rents. 
3.2.3   Option 2:  Narrow Definition of Specialized Service, and Little 
Regulation of Specialized Services 
 The FCC has tentatively concluded that specialized (or non-BIAS) 
services require no rules.   Indeed, there may be little need for rules on 
discrimination and blocking if there are adequate limits to the 
definition of specialized services and if the rules regarding 
“unreasonably interfering with or unreasonably disadvantaging” allow 
reasonable discrimination within a BIAS, so that applications 
requiring better quality of service can be supported. 
 In the absence of clear limits on the definition of specialized 
services, current technology would make it easy for Internet access 
providers to engage in unreasonable discrimination among their 
offerings, while maintaining the illusion that their specialized services 
are somehow distinct from their BIAS.  For example, as previously 
suggested, traffic from a supposed specialized service “may be sent 
over a separate virtual local area network (VLAN), or a separate 
service flow in a cable system operating under the Data Over Cable 
Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) standard.”39 While the VLAN 
or service flow for a specialized service may appear to be separate 
from general Internet traffic, traffic from both services travel through 
the same bottleneck links, and the VLAN or service flow identifier is 
38 Peha, A “Most Favored Nation” Approach to an Open Internet, supra note 18.  
39 Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a 
Balanced Policy, supra note 34, at 649. 
30 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
used to give the supposed specialized service priority over other traffic 
during periods of congestion.  In reality, this is simply a priority 
Internet service. A large loophole would be created if priority Internet 
services receive blanket exemption from Open Internet rules 
regarding discrimination and blocking because they were given a 
specialized service label. 
 If we consider the case where few rules, if any, are imposed on 
specialized services, then we must ask whether there are cases where 
FCC rules should allow ISPs to engage in the most blatantly 
anticompetitive forms of discrimination or blocking, and then limit 
the definition of specialized services to just those cases. For this 
situation to arise, a company must offer two communications services. 
One is a BIAS and subject to Open Internet rules. The other is not 
Internet access, and imposing Open Internet rules on this service 
would be inappropriate.   
 For a service to be exempt from Open Internet discrimination and 
blocking rules without undue risk of the kind of oligopoly rents 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, that service should not be Internet access.  
Also, it should not be just another way to communicate with things 
that users would otherwise access over the Internet, as that would 
make it a trivial substitute for Internet.40 Finally, it should not operate 
over limited resources that would otherwise be used for Internet, as 
that would make it a simple Internet service with preferred access to 
shared resources. 
 There are services with the properties above for which the 
application of Open Internet rules would be inappropriate.  This can 
occur when Open Internet rules apply to separate networks as if they 
were one network.  Consider a company that offers two IP-based 
services.  One gives a user access to the entire Internet, and the other 
gives a user access to a closed and highly secure network with 
endpoints that trust each other.  For example, a company might use 
the closed network to connect its various offices and the residences of 
some trusted employees.  The network for Internet access and the 
closed network are separate in that traffic from one cannot reach the 
other, cannot carry malware to the other, and cannot even cause 
congestion to the other, which is precisely what makes the closed 
network valuable to its users.  To further enhance the security and 





40 Id. (warning that  discrimination can be accomplished if “one can simply provide 
separate channels for different classes of traffic.” For example, “favored traffic may be sent 
over a lightly used wavelength in a fiberoptic cable, while other traffic goes over a heavily 
used wavelength.”). 
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blocked.  Open Internet rules should not be imposed on the closed 
network, as this might allow traffic from unknown sources and 
unknown applications into the network, thereby reducing the closed 
network’s value to users. Note that this is a true private network, and 
not a mere virtual private network (VPN) where private traffic and 
regular Internet traffic are intermixed within shared capacity.  The 
VPN label should not automatically exempt a service from Open 
Internet rules. 
 Another example is when a company offers both an Internet and a 
telephone service that are entirely separate.  Consider the case where 
the telephone network is upgraded from circuits to VOIP, while 
remaining separate from the network that provides Internet access.  
This alone should not make the telephone service subject to Open 
Internet rules, which would prohibit blocking non-VOIP packets.  
Otherwise, companies might be discouraged from improving 
technology.  
 Both of the services above do not meet the definition of Internet 
access service and are not a trivial substitute for Internet because 
customers use them to access endpoints that are not on the open 
Internet.  In the first case, those endpoints are other trusted 
computers within the company’s private network.  In the second case, 
the endpoint accessed is a VOIP-Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) gateway that is operated by the carrier and is accessible only 
through the carrier’s closed network.  In addition, central to the 
examples above, the service that is exempt from Open Internet rules is 
truly separate from Internet access.  Implicitly, some of the debate 
about specialized services is over what it means for two services to be 
separate.  I propose here a simple litmus test that should be used to 
determine if services are separate, along with a condition to exclude 
services that are trivial substitutes for Internet. 
A communications service can be considered a 
specialized service under Open Internet rules if (i) the 
primary use of the service is not to access content, 
services, or systems that are accessible through an 
Internet access service, and (ii) the service does not 
share capacity with Internet access.   
Two services are said to “share capacity” if it is ever 
possible for utilization of one service to affect the 
performance of the other service. 
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 The precise definition of sharing capacity is important. For 
example, when a telephone network offers a traditional DSL service, 
circuit-switched telephone and Internet services  operate over the 
same copper wire, but they do not share capacity.  Internet and 
telephone traffic travel within separate frequency bands in the last-
mile connection, arrive at separate switches at the central office, and 
are forwarded into separate nationwide networks (i.e., the PSTN and 
the Internet).  If there is a high volume of Internet traffic on the last-
mile link, in the IP router closest to the user, or in any link or router 
anywhere on the global Internet, this will not affect telephone service 
in any way.  Similarly, a high volume of telephone traffic will not 
reduce the performance of the Internet service.  This would not 
change if the telephone service was converted to VOIP, but the 
capacity allocated to telephone service is fixed, as is the capacity 
allocated to Internet service.  In contrast, if VOIP packets are sent 
over the same last-mile link as Internet traffic and VOIP packets are 
simply given transmission priority over Internet traffic based on 
VLAN label, then telephone utilization would somewhat degrade the 
quality of Internet service.  Contrary to what some ISPs will claim, this 
latter case is an example of shared capacity, and the proposed 
definition above makes this clear. 
 The impact of a specialized services rule on telephone and cable 
TV services deserves particular attention, in part because these two 
services have played a particularly important role in the business case 
for Internet access (e.g., as part of “Triple Play” service), and in part 
because these two services have their own regulations.  Some IP-based 
telephone and cable TV services would qualify as specialized services 
under the proposed rule above, but some would not.  For example, 
with AT&T’s U-verse service, a customer who begins watching a pay-
per-view video may notice a sudden decrease in Internet performance 
because capacity is shared.  AT&T adopted this architecture years ago, 
and if the FCC were to decide now that this technical approach makes 
the IP-based service used for video distribution subject to Open 
Internet rules, it would be disruptive.  Consequently, I propose the 
following rule to specifically address IP-based telephone and cable TV 
services. 
A communications service can be considered a 
specialized service under Open Internet rules if the 
service is only used to provide a service that is subject 
to telephone regulations or to cable TV regulations. 
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 If specialized services are limited to the extent proposed in this 
section, then it is important for the FCC rules against “unfair 
disadvantaging” to allow reasonable discrimination within BIAS as 
this will allow applications that benefit from superior quality of 
service to develop. 
3.2.4   Summary 
 It is important that the FCC adopt appropriate rules for specialized 
services.  Failure to do so could provide a loophole that would allow 
even the most harmful forms of discrimination or “paid priority” to 
gain widespread use. It could also have the effect of denying Internet 
users access to valuable applications that require good quality of 
service.  The following table summarizes the policy approaches in 
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 that are intended to avoid both problems.  
Discrimination 
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4  CONGRESS: GOOD AND BAD APPROACHES FOR NEW LEGISLATION 
 New legislation could change everything.  This section explores 
ways that Congress could respond if it is displeased with the FCC’s 
2015 order, and some of the challenges that must be addressed if new 
legislation is to lead to effective policy. Section 4.1 discusses 
legislation that is narrowly focused on reversing reclassification, while 
leaving the rest of the 1996 Telecommunications Act largely 
unchanged.  Section 4.2 discusses the idea of creating a new category 
of regulation beyond telecommunications and information services 
that would be appropriate for Internet access.  Section 4.3 discusses 
the idea of more fundamental reform that would replace the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
4.1 Reversing Reclassification 
 To some in Congress, the most obvious way to reverse the FCC’s 
2015 Report and Order is to pass legislation that simply requires the 
FCC to define Internet access services as an information service. For 
example, Congress could pass a law that makes its own determination 
that Internet access is an information service, as might occur with the 
following language that appeared in a proposed House bill:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provision of 
broadband Internet access service or any other mass market retail 
service providing advanced telecommunications capability (as defined 
in section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. [§] 
1302)) shall be considered to be an information service.”41 
 Alternatively, Congress could pass a law that nullifies the FCC’s 
March 2015 Report and Order, as in a proposed Senate bill:  
“Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Federal 
Communications Commission relating to regulating broadband 
Internet access (published at 80 Fed. Reg. 19737 (April 13, 2015)), and 
such rule shall have no force or effect.”42 
 This approach is tempting because it does not require 
reconsideration of the many complex issues surrounding regulation of 
telephone, Internet, cellular, content, and application services.  Such 
41 H.R. 15, 114th Cong., at 5 (2015) (Discussion Draft), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114
/BILLS-114hr-PIH-OpenInternet.pdf. 
42 S.J. Res. 15, 114th Cong. (2015), available at 
www.paul.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NetNeu.pdf. 
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legislation appears to bring a return to the laws of 2014 and nothing 
more, but that is not actually the case.  The problem is that insisting 
that Internet access is an information service, rather than a 
telecommunications service, without any change to the definitions of 
“information” and “telecommunications services,” is an attempt to 
legislate facts, rather than to legislate policy.  When the FCC 
concluded in 2015 that broadband Internet access was a better fit for 
the legal definition of telecommunications service than the legal 
definition of information service, this was a finding of fact, rather than 
a policy ruling.  Moreover, as shown in Section 2, it was an 
appropriate finding of fact for Internet access services as offered in 
2015.  Passing a new telecommunications law to overturn this finding 
of fact is like passing a law that winter in the U.S. is warmer than 
summer, and the sun rises in the north; laws do not change facts.  
 This approach is worse than ineffectual in that it builds an 
inherent contradiction between the new law and some unchanged 
portions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which could bring 
confusion and uncertainty.  If broadband Internet access service is an 
information service, notwithstanding the fact that its core service is 
the transfer of information “without change in the form or content” 
that we expect in a telecommunications service,43 then precisely what 
can be called a telecommunications service?  We may agree that the 
telephone systems that existed when the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act was passed offered telecommunications services, but telephone 
systems have changed, and there is room for confusion about 
classification of current telephone systems even without a new law 
that contradicts the old.   
 Consider a telephone company that completely abandons 
traditional, circuit-switched technology in its core in favor of IP, so its 
core network cannot be distinguished from that of a provider of 
broadband Internet access by technology.  This company offers its 
telephone customers content over their smart phones in what appear 
to be information services bundled with telephony, much like how 
many broadband Internet access providers offer email service along 
with IP Packet Transfer.  While IP prevails in the core, the company 
supports diverse technologies in its wired and wireless last-mile 
connections, so that some customers have phones that exchange IP 
packets, some have phones that operate over a digital circuit, and 
some may even have phones that operate over an analog circuit.  Thus, 
the company’s basic telephone service arguably provides a change in 
43 Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 8. 
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the form of information transmitted, although not a change in 
content, which is not consistent with the statutory definition of 
telecommunications.  This is not the telephone system that lawmakers 
had in mind when they passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
The argument that this new kind of telephone service is an 
information service is not perfect, but it is at least as good as the 
argument that the broadband Internet access offered today is an 
information service.  Now imagine that this telephone service comes 
bundled with Internet access, and Congress has just passed a law that 
Internet access is an information service without modifying or 
clarifying the definition of information service.  This must strengthen 
the argument that this bundle, which includes telephony, is an 
information service and is therefore exempt from Title II regulation. 
Title II regulation could become easy to evade. 
 If Congress wants to make sure that Internet access service is 
regulated as an information service without creating this kind of 
uncertainty, then Congress needs to pass legislation that does more 
than simply reverse a finding of fact.  The following sections will 
consider more expansive options.  
4.2 A New Category for Internet Access Services 
 Through new legislation, Congress could establish three, rather 
than two, types of services:  telecommunications services, information 
services, and Internet access services.  This would involve rewriting 
one or both of the definitions of telecommunications and information 
services to remove the contradictions discussed in the preceding 
section. It might also involve separating Internet access services from 
“advanced telecommunications” (as defined in Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996), as was done in a recently proposed 
law.44 Further, the law would establish a new regulatory regime for the 
new Internet access class.  This could include whatever network 
neutrality rules (or lack thereof) that Congress deems to be 
appropriate, which should make this an attractive option to those 
lawmakers who would like to see Congress, rather than the FCC, take 
the lead on network neutrality.  This approach, however, demands 
legislation that is more comprehensive than the proposed legislation 
we have seen to date. 
 Decades of decisions by lawmakers, regulators, and courts have 
brought some degree of clarity over the rules surrounding 
44 Discussion Draft, supra note 41.  
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telecommunications services and information services, and further 
study is required to determine how much of that would apply to a 
newly-created legal category for Internet access providers.  Thus, 
lawmakers writing legislation of this kind must consider a wide range 
of issues that go well beyond network neutrality.  For example, if 
Internet access service is not an “information service,” a 
“telecommunications service,” or an “advanced telecommunications 
service” as defined in Section 706, will providers of Internet access 
service be viewed as providers or curators of information that are 
entitled to the right of freedom of expression, as cable TV operators 
and news websites are?45 If they are viewed as information providers 
or curators, then under what circumstances is an Internet access 
provider liable for unlawful transfers of information over its network, 
as can occur with copyrighted material, child pornography, online 
gambling, or incitements to violence?  Do laws that protect Internet 
access providers from liability allow or mandate technology designed 
to detect unlawful transfers, or even block them? Such policies should 
consider the operating cost externalities, the privacy implications, and 
the inherently imperfect nature of these tools, which cannot always 
determine the legality of a transfer correctly.46 Can Internet access 
providers refuse to provide service to some potential customers?  
Must they pay into universal service funds, and can they receive 
universal service funds?  In what way are they subject to wiretapping 
from law enforcement?  Do Internet access providers have rights to 
pole attachments?   
 Determining whether or how each of these issues may change with 
new legislation is beyond the scope of this article.  A failure to address 
any one of these issues in an appropriate manner, however, could 
have significant, unintended consequences.  Thus, this option would 
require a much more thorough investigation than is immediately 
apparent. 
4.3 Reimagining the Communications Act 
45 Barbara A. Cherry & Jullien Mailland, Towards Sustainable Network-Openness 
Obligations on Broadband in the U.S.: Surviving Providers’ First Amendment Challenges, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Mar. 29, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417758. 
46 Jon M. Peha & Alexandre M. Mateus, Policy Implications of Technology for Detecting 
P2P and Copyright Violations, 38 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 66, 66-85  (Jan. 2014), 
www.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/policy_implications_of_P2P_detection_technology.pdf. 
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 The idea from Section 4.2 of keeping a telecommunications 
services category for telephony and an information services category 
for content providers, while creating a new category for Internet 
access providers, is an attractive strategy for those trying to create the 
law they wish had been written in 1996.  At that time, content and 
application services such as e-mail and online newsgroups were 
operating on top of the Internet, while, in many ways, the Internet 
operated on top of the telephone system.  Residential users were using 
telephone dial-up connections to reach an Internet gateway, and 
Internet backbone networks were operating over long-distance 
circuits leased from telephone companies.  Thus, the issue of 
classifying Internet access can be viewed as deciding whether to 
include the Internet in the layer above it or the layer below it, even 
though neither is a perfect fit.   Creating a middle category is, 
therefore, a reasonable solution. 
 Still, anyone trying to write the perfect legislation for 1996 is 
creating a law that is already decades out of date. Thus, Congress has 
another option: Write a new telecommunications act that will serve 
the nation well in future decades, rather than in decades already past.  
Today’s Internet does not operate over a telephone network.  It is 
more accurate to say that telephony is just another application—like e-
mail, news websites, or social media—and all of these applications 
operate on top of a common IP-based broadband transmission 
facility.  Cable television pay-per-view services used by a growing 
number of consumers can also be viewed as an application on top of 
this shared platform, rather than the separate system it was in 1996.  
Applications differ in that some, such as telephony and cable 
television pay-per-view, are typically offered today by a vertically-
integrated entity that also provides broadband transmission services, 
whereas applications such as Twitter and the New York Times website 
are not.  Of course, this may change. Moreover, vertically-integrated 
applications may compete with non-vertically-integrated applications, 
such as when IP-based cable TV pay-per-view services compete with 
IP-based, over-the-top video services.  Another difference is that end 
users access some applications using a service that is labeled as 
“Internet access,” and end users access other applications using a 
service that might be labeled as a “specialized” or “non-BIAS data 
service,” as discussed in Section 3.  Nevertheless, all these applications 
operate over a common platform that uses IP Packet Transfer to move 
information from place to place without change in form or content.  
Because that platform is shared, allocating more resources for the user 
of one application to improve quality of service may reduce the 
resources available for the user of another application.  Sooner or 
later, policies that reflect this new reality will be necessary. 
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 This new, technical architecture has many implications for those 
who would write a new telecommunications act.  First, it has long 
been the case that the cost of deploying and operating a wired 
infrastructure depends more on the miles covered than on the amount 
of information carried, which creates a high financial barrier to enter 
the market. In 1996, when the underlying wired infrastructure was the 
telephone network, lawmakers concluded that they had to subsidize 
providers of telephone service in sparsely populated areas where cost 
per household was high and regulate telephone networks everywhere 
because competition would be limited.  There was little need to 
regulate Internet access providers that offered dial-up service on top 
of the telephone network because strong competition was likely at this 
layer. If a new telecommunications act presumes, however, that the 
underlying infrastructure provides IP-based broadband services and 
that telephony is just an application, then it is broadband 
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infrastructure rather than telephone infrastructure that requires 
subsidies in rural areas. Moreover, it is broadband Internet access 
service rather than telephone service that may need some kind of 
regulation to address limited competition.  We have already seen the 
FCC moving in this direction in both universal service policy47 and 
network neutrality policy.  Indeed, as discussed in The Benefits and 
Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a 
Balanced Policy,48 the technology shift from Internet over dial-up to 
facilities-based broadband Internet is part of what made network 
neutrality an important issue in the first place. These trends can 
eventually be reflected in legislation as well. 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996  included regulations of 
telephone and cable TV services that presumed that both were 
vertically integrated.49 The next telecommunications act will view 
them as applications.  Thus, unlike its predecessor, the next act is 
likely to include application-layer obligations that apply to both 
facilities-based and non-facilities-based providers, to the extent 
possible. This may include common requirements for telephone 
services to be compatible with E-911 emergency services and common 
obligations of video distribution services to copyright holders.  
(Nevertheless, decentralized versions of telephone or video 
applications may create challenges because there may be no 
centralized entity in charge to regulate them.)  
 At the same time, the next telecommunications act must 
accommodate competition between facilities-based and non-facilities-
based providers of the same application, as occurs when cable TV pay-
per-view competes with over-the-top services like Netflix, and when 
traditional telephone companies compete with Vonage or Skype.  In 
part, that means addressing the specialized services issues discussed 
in Section 3, which are at the core of promoting competition and 
innovation when quality of service matters.  It may also include 
consideration of differences in fees imposed on facilities-based and 





47 See The National Broadband Plan, FCC (Mar. 2010), www.fcc.gov/national-broadband-
plan. 
48 The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced 
Policy, supra note 34, at 645-46. 
49 Telecommunications Act of 1996, available at 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). 
2015] PEHA 41 
5 CONCLUSION 
 In March 2015, the FCC issued a new set of network neutrality 
rules, and used Title II of the Communications Act to support that 
decision after finding that broadband Internet access services are 
telecommunications services.  This marks the end of the latest chapter 
on network neutrality policy, but we are far from the end of the book.  
Further debate must now occur in the courts, at the FCC, and in 
Congress. 
 Based on an examination of Internet technology and architecture, 
I find that the services provided today by commercial Internet access 
providers are consistent with the definition of telecommunications 
services established in the 1996 Telecommunications Act and are not 
consistent with the definition of information services established in 
this Act.  It will, therefore, be difficult for courts to overturn the FCC’s 
decision on the grounds that the FCC is wrong on the facts, and that 
the court understands these technical facts better than the expert 
agency.  This does not guarantee that plaintiffs will be unable to find 
some other grounds for complaint, such as a procedural issue.  
However, the core of the FCC’s legal case, which was built on the 
arguments in Section 2 and a comment to the FCC’s Open Internet 
Proceeding,50 is strong. 
 Nevertheless, actual network neutrality policy is far from clear.  
The FCC decided not to provide a clear definition of what it now calls 
non-BIAS data services (and previously called specialized services), 
and decided not to clarify what regulations are enforceable with non-
BIAS data services.  As a result, it may be relatively easy to circumvent 
supposedly “bright-line” rules, such as the prohibitions on blocking 
and paid prioritization.  Thus, the FCC has more work to do on 
network neutrality, and the next decisions made by the FCC could 
have an even greater impact on actual network neutrality policy than 
the decision to classify Internet access as a telecommunications 
service.  There is also, still, significant uncertainty over the precise 
meaning of “unreasonabl[e] interfere[ing] and unreasonabl[e] 
disadvantage[ing].”51 Future decisions on this issue will greatly 
determine what Internet access providers can and cannot do to 
provide superior quality of service for some traffic. 
50 Cherry & Peha, supra note 4. 
62 Id.  
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 This paper has proposed two sets of policy options for the 
unresolved issues above. Both options are intended to balance a desire 
to promote innovation among applications that may benefit from 
superior quality of service and a desire to prevent Internet access 
providers with significant market power from using their control over 
quality of service to become gatekeepers or to seek rents.  One such 
policy would allow reasonable discrimination within a broadband 
Internet access service and greatly limit the services that can avoid 
Open Internet rules as non-BIAS data services or specialized services.  
The other policy would allow the definition of specialized services to 
be much broader, but would establish some Open Internet rules for 
specialized services as well. 
 Finally, those in Congress who are dissatisfied with the FCC’s 2015 
Report and Order can always change policy by passing new legislation.  
The simplest way to do this is to pass a law declaring that Internet 
access services are information services, while keeping the current 
definitions of telecommunications and information services intact.  
This is also the most problematic form of legislation, as it is likely to 
bring uncertainty and the risk of unintended consequences. The FCC’s 
decision to classify broadband Internet access service as a 
telecommunications service using the definitions Congress established 
in 1996 is a finding of fact.  If Congress wants a different outcome, it 
should change the definitions.  A more effective approach would be to 
establish three, rather than two, distinct definitions for 
telecommunications service, information service, and Internet access 
service.  This is viable, but it raises complex issues that deserve more 
thorough consideration than one might first imagine.  Moreover, this 
approach may make sense for those who want a law that works well 
for the last twenty years, but we may need something very different for 
the next twenty years.  Thus, it would make more sense for interested 
legislators to begin work on the next telecommunications act.  The 
current act was written for a different era. 
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